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I formulate a model to emphasize the fraud detection role of auditors in the nancial
market, providing a theoretical framework to examine the likelihood of and market
reaction to a nancial reporting and audit delay. The model has an auditor considering
whether to perform extended audit procedures after observing a red ag generatd from
regular audit procedures. An audit delay is represented by the event of extending audit
procedures and manifested as a nancial reporting delay observed by the market. I
nd that the equilibrium likelihood of a delay decreases when the reliability of regular
and extended audit procedures improves and/or when the ex ante probability of fraud
reduces. My result on the market reaction to a delay suggests that while a negative
average reaction is intuitive and has been documented, the reaction can be positive for
an individual rm. I derive a closed-form condition indicating when a positive reaction
is possible. Specically, a delay can be good news to the market when the ex ante
probability of fraud, the imprecision of a red ag, and the eectiveness of extended
audit procedures for detecting fraud are all high. The result is new in the literature. I
also discuss the model's empirical implications with suggestions for regression equation
specications. (JEL M42/G32/K42)
Keywords: Audit delay, nancial reporting lag, extended audit procedures, red ag,
fraud detection, SAS 82, SAS 99, business ethics.
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Fraud Detection and Financial Reporting and Audit Delay
Abstract
I formulate a model to emphasize the fraud detection role of auditors in the nancial
market, providing a theoretical framework to examine the likelihood of and market
reaction to a nancial reporting and audit delay. The model has an auditor considering
whether to perform extended audit procedures after observing a red ag generatd from
regular audit procedures. An audit delay is represented by the event of extending audit
procedures and manifested as a nancial reporting delay observed by the market. I
nd that the equilibrium likelihood of a delay decreases when the reliability of regular
and extended audit procedures improves and/or when the ex ante probability of fraud
reduces. My result on the market reaction to a delay suggests that while a negative
average reaction is intuitive and has been documented, the reaction can be positive for
an individual rm. I derive a closed-form condition indicating when a positive reaction
is possible. Specically, a delay can be good news to the market when the ex ante
probability of fraud, the imprecision of a red ag, and the eectiveness of extended
audit procedures for detecting fraud are all high. The result is new in the literature. I
also discuss the model's empirical implications with suggestions for regression equation
specications. (JEL M42/G32/K42)
Keywords: Audit delay, nancial reporting lag, extended audit procedures, red ag,
fraud detection, SAS 82, SAS 99, business ethics.
1 Introduction
On June 4, 2009 came the news of the alleged fraud in Countrywide Financial, the largest
mortgage loan provider in the US before the credit crunch hit (Morgenson, 2009). The
allegation to Countrywide reminds people of a long expected but unfullled role of auditors
in the nancial market: fraud detection. In this paper, I formulate a model to emphasize
this role and relate it to nancial reporting and audit delays that have long been studied in
the literature.
1
Consistent with Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99 (SAS 99), the model has an
auditor considering whether to perform extended audit procedures, depending on whether a
red ag is observed after regular audit procedures. Plenty of examples suggest that nancial
reporting delays are often the consequence of extending audit procedures to investigate
accounting irregularities.
2
A nancial reporting delay thus suggests to outside investors
that a red ag was observed by the auditor and has triggered extended audit procedures.
3
The dierence between regular and extended audit procedures can be related to the
context of the Bagnoli, Kross, and Watts (2002) study. They observe that rms voluntar-
ily disclose in advance the expected earnings announcement dates, and the market reacts
adversely to each day of delay. Presumably the extent of regular audit procedures is as-
certained during the audit planning phase and should be communicated to a client at the
beginning of the whole process. Hence, the extent of regular audit procedures is likely to
be a factor aecting the client rm's expectation on when it can make the earnings an-
1
Prior models of fraud detection such as Matsumura and Tucker (1992) have not related the fraud
detection role of auditors to nancial reporting and audit delays.
2
For instance, Sensormatic Electronics Corp.'s accounting rm has expanded the scope of its annual au-
dit, forcing the company to delay its annual earnings report and raising the possibility of downward revisions
to past earnings (Wall Street Journal, 1995). Another example is Royal Ahold, a Dutch retail group with
subsidiaries such as Stop & Shop in the US and Albert Heijn in the Netherlands. The audit of Ahold's
consolidated 2002 has been extended because of a number of new internal investigations at US Foodservice
(the unit at the heart of the nancial scandal) .... Deloitte & Touche, which is carrying out the audit, said
that, while important progress had been made in these investigations, various delays in their completion
had placed the resumption of important parts of the total audit some four to six weeks behind schedule. ...
Based on the information received to date, intentional accounting irregularities involving earnings manage-
ment and misapplications of generally accepted accounting principles were found ... (Decision News Media
SAS, 2003).
3
In a conversation with a recently retired Big4 audit rm partner, he conrmed that red ags observed
during audits can trigger additional audit work and result in nancial reporting delays of clients. He explained
that clients constantly give pressure to urge completing the audits as soon as possible but additional audit
work, if deemed necessary, is important to auditors' risk management.
1
nouncement. A delay occurs when the auditor extends audit procedures in response to some
red ag observed after performing regular audit procedures. Since the delay is triggered
by some red ag, it changes the market's expectation about the existence of fraud in the
rm. Consequently, the market might react adversely to the delay. The analysis of this
paper formalizes these intuitions. It also yields a new result that is not easy to discover
without rigorously analyzing a formal model. Specically, I show that a positive reaction
to a delay is possible when it is perceived by market investors as good news under certain
circumstances.
4
The model of this paper has an auditor with a client rm managed by an entrepreneur
referred to as an insider. The insider needs capital to invest in a project. He is interested
in raising external capital. Outside investors and the auditor are aware of the possibility
that the insider can secretly divert some resources from the rm for his private benet. The
outside investors and auditor therefore behave strategically to guard against the potential
(but not immediately noticeable) misappropriation, say, by accepting only properly priced
equity oering terms and by extending audit procedures adequately.
5
In the model, an audit delay is represented by the event of extending audit procedures.
Such a delay might not be immediately observable to outside investors in reality. I therefore
assume an audit delay is manifested as a nancial reporting delay, although the latter is
not explicitly modeled here. The rst main result of the paper concerns the equilibrium
likelihood of a nancial reporting and audit delay. I nd that the delay likelihood decreases
when the reliability of regular and extended audit procedures improves and/or when the prior
probability of having a dishonest insider reduces. Intuitively speaking, the more reliable
audit procedures are, the lower the chance of observing a false-positive red ag and the
higher the chance of catching a dishonest insider. He is thus less aggressive in choosing
the extent of diversion. Consequently, the auditor has less incentive to perform extended
4
In Table 5 of Bagnoli, Kross, and Watts (2002), they report that the mean and median cumulative
market-adjusted returns (CARs) of the entire group of late-announcer rms are negative. However, they
also document that the third quartile of CARs is positive and growing as the delay lengthens, suggesting
that a delay indeed may be perceived by the market as good news.
5
SAS 99 denes fraud as an intentional act resulting in a material misstatement in nancial statements
and distinguishes between two types of fraud: (i) those arising from fraudulent nancial reporting (e.g.,
falsication of accounting records); (ii) those from misappropriation of assets (e.g., fraudulent expenditures,
or theft of assets). The model of this paper discusses diversion of a rm's resources, which is closer to the
latter.
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audit procedures frequently. As a result, a delay occurs less often. If the prior probability
of having a dishonest insider is lower, it triggers a red ag less often. A delay is thus less
often seen.
In this model, outside investors worry about an insider secretly diverting rm resources
for his private benet. The diverted resources will become irrecoverable if the fraud is not
discovered timely by the auditor. When outside investors see a nancial reporting delay,
which in this model is due to an audit delay, they know two things have happened. First,
the auditor must have observed some red ag of potential fraud; otherwise, extended audit
procedures would not have been triggered. So outside investors should revise the expected
rm value downward. However, an audit delay also means the auditor is doing extra work,
increasing the chance of discovering a fraud and recovering any diverted resources. For this
reason, outside investors should revise the expected rm value upward. Whether the overall
market reaction is negative or positive depends on the relative magnitudes of these opposing
eects.
The key result of the paper is a closed-form condition indicating when a positive market
reaction to a delay is possible. If the red ag generated from regular audit procedures is not
so informative, a delay may simply be a false alarm, and there is little to worry about by
outside investors. When the prior probability of having a dishonest insider is high, a delay
resulting from a red ag observed by the auditor can be good. The delay is particularly
good when extended audit procedures are very eective in detecting fraud, leaving little
chance for a fraud to sneak through. In short, a delay can be good news to outside investors
when the ex ante probability of fraud, the imprecision of a red ag, and the eectiveness of
detecting fraud are all high.
Besides the main results above, the paper also provides a discussion about the equilibirum
relation between outside ownership and audit fee. In this model, the strategic interaction
between the auditor and her client leads to an equilibrium audit fee independent of the
outside ownership. When the outside ownership is lower, the interest of the insider is better
aligned with that of the rm. One might think that the fraud risk should be lower and
hence the auditor would not extend audit procedures so often. Extra costs that constitute
the audit fee would be incurred less frequently, presumably resulting in a lower audit fee.
3
This however is not the complete story. When the auditor worries less because of lower
outside ownership, she has a weaker incentive to extend audit procedures. Anticipating a
lower probability of extended audit, a dishonest insider worries less about being caught and
has a stronger induced incentive to divert resources. In the end, the two eects balance
out and have no net impact on the equilibrium audit fee in this model.
Despite the lack of a causality running from outside ownership to audit fee, they are
positively associated with each other. The association is due to both a direct and an indirect
eect. The direct eect is that the payout of a higher audit fee results in a lower year-end
rm value. Hence, outside investors demand more favorable equity oering terms up front,
in terms of higher outside ownership for any given level of capital raised. In addition,
exogenous factors like the reliability of regular and extended audit procedures aect both
the audit fee and the diversion rate chosen by a dishonest insider. Any changes in such
factors that lead to a higher diversion rate also raise the audit fee. Anticipating a higher
diversion rate, outside investors again demand more favorable equity oering terms up front.
This second eect is an indirect way for outside ownership to be associated with the audit
fee positively.
This paper makes three contributions. First, I formulate a model to provide a theoretical
framework to examine the likelihood of and market reaction to a nancial reporting and audit
delay. Empirical studies have examined such issues extensively.
6
However, rarely have the
studies developed hypotheses for testing using any formal theoretical model. Prior analytical
models on nancial reporting timeliness follow the voluntary disclosure literature, assuming
a nancial reporting delay is a voluntary, strategic decision (e.g., Gennotte and Trueman
1996). These models are completely dierent from mine that emphasizes the fraud detection
role of auditors in the nancial market and the involuntariness of a nancial reporting delay
arising from an audit delay.
Second, my result on the market reaction to a delay suggests that while a negative average
6
Research in the audit delay literature includes Lambert, Brazel, and Jones (2008), Ettredge, Li, and Sun
(2006), Johnson, Davies, and Freeman (2002), Knechel and Payne (2001), McLelland and Giroux (2000),
Bamber, Bamber, and Schoderbek (1993), Dwyer and Wilson (1989), and Ashton, Willingham, and Elliott
(1987). Studies investigating the determinants and eects of nancial reporting timeliness include Owusu-
Ansah and Leventis (2006), Sengupta (2004), Begley and Fischer (1998), Alford, Jones, and Zmijewski
(1994), Chambers and Penman (1984), and Givoly and Palmon (1982). Krishnan and Yang (2009) study
audit report lags as well as earnings announcement lags together.
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reaction is intuitive and has been documented by empirical studies, the reaction does not
have to be negative for an individual rm. I derive a closed-form condition indicating when a
positive market reaction to a delay is possible. This is a new result not previously discussed
in the literature.
Besides relating the fraud detection role of auditors to nancial reporting and audit de-
lays, another main objective of the paper is to address the need of empirical researchers.
This is done by deriving theoretical results in closed form that give clearer guidance on
empirical research designs. To serve this purpose, more specic functional forms and ex-
ogenous parameters are used in the model to capture the fundamental rst-order eects of
relevant economic forces. I provide a detailed discussion of the empirical implications of
the model, including suggestions for regression equation specications. With this, I open
a dialog with empirical researchers and stimulate closer interaction between empirical and
analytical researchers. This is the third contribution of the paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section briey reviews the
background of SAS 99 that has inspired the model of this paper. The model setup is
described in section 3, with dierent parties' equilibrium decisions analyzed in section 4.
Empirical-oriented readers can skip section 4 and jump directly to section 5, where I discuss
the model's empirical implications. Such readers can go back to the preceding section for a
glance of the analysis when doing so is necessary to understand the empirical implications.
Section 6 provides a discussion relating this paper to other studies. The paper concludes
with remarks in section 7. An illustrative example of an empirical test design is given in
appendix A. Technical proofs and derivations are relegated to appendix B.
2 Background
The debate on the fraud detection role of auditors in the nancial market has a long history.
It was initially framed by the accounting profession as an expectation gap issue. Advocates
argued that the assumed integrity of the management is a necessary starting point for an
audit engagement. This debate cooled down slightly in the 90's. It has gained attention
again following the collapse of Arthur Andersen, one of the biggest ve accounting rms in
5
the world. Its collapse was closely tied to the accounting scandals of a number of companies,
including the telecommunication giant WorldCom and especially the energy giant Enron.
The American Institute of Certied Public Accountants (AICPA) rst ocially empha-
sized the fraud detection role of auditors in the release of SAS 82 in 1997. This statement
superseded SAS 53 The Auditor's Responsibility to Detect and Report Errors and Irregu-
larities released in 1988. Entitled Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit,
SAS 82 is the rst SAS mentioning fraud in the title. The then Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) Chief Accountant Michael H. Sutton praised SAS 82 for referring to
fraud by name, for the rst time, instead of by the more euphemistic term `irregularities'
and for describing over 40 fraud risk factors that auditors must consider in planning and
performing an audit. (Journal of Accountancy, Feb. 1997)
In October 2002, partly in response to the accounting scandals and the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act (SOX) that followed, the AICPA released SAS 99. This statement superseded SAS 82
but with the same title. The updated standard provides more guidelines on how auditors
should structure an audit plan to better serve the fraud detection function. According to
the standard, auditors are required to consider whether [misstatements identied by audit
test results] may be indicative of fraud. ... If the auditor believes that the misstatement is
or may be the results of fraud, and either has determined that the eect could be material
to the nancial statements or has been unable to evaluate whether the eect is material,
the auditor should ... [a]ttempt to obtain additional audit evidence to determine whether
material fraud has occurred or is likely to have occurred, and, if so, its eect on the nancial
statements and the auditor's report thereon. (AU Section 316, paragraphs 75 and 77;
emphasis added.)
In short, this standard requires an auditor to consider whether misstatements identied
by audit test results may be indicative of fraud and if so, the auditor should attempt to
obtain additional audit evidence to clarify the situation. Considering red ags from audit
test results and obtaining additional audit evidence are decisions auditors should think
about carefully in assessing fraud risks. They are also two important elements of the model
formulated in the next section to understand the fraud detection role of auditors in the
nancial market.
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3 A Model of Extended Audit for Fraud Detection
The model formulated here has a setup similar to the Newman, Patterson, and Smith (2005)
(hereafter NPS) modication of the Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) model. I depart from the
NPS model mainly in the strategic consideration of extending audit procedures contingent
on the red ag observed, if any.
7
In the following, I rst outline the basic setup, followed by
a description of the sequence of events in the model.
The model has an auditor with a client rm managed by an entrepreneur, or insider
in NPS's terminology. The insider needs capital to invest in a project with a known rate of
return g on any invested amount. He is interested in raising an endogenously determined
amount of external capital, denoted by K, to add to the exogenously endowed wealth he has,
denoted by W , to invest in the project. Outside investors and the auditor are aware of the
possibility that he can secretly divert some resources from the rm for his private benet.
As a result, the rm value suggested by the rm's nancial statements actually overstates
the underlying true value. The outside investors and auditor therefore behave strategically
to guard against the potential (but not immediately noticeable) misappropriation, say, by
accepting only properly priced equity oering terms and by extending audit procedures
adequately. All parties in the model are risk neutral.
Below is the sequence of events in the model:
1. The nature determines the type of the insider: honest or dishonest. The prior prob-
ability of having a dishonest insider is , where 0 <  < 1. An honest insider never




Patterson and Smith (2007) have analyzed a model with a two-round audit similar to the one examined
here. They study the eects of SOX on an auditor's choice of eort in performing control tests (the rst-
round audit) before doing substantive tests (the second-round audit). The auditor in their model always
performs both rounds of audit. Therefore, their setup is more like a rened modeling of the regular audit
procedures of my model, which are performed unconditionally. By contrast, the auditor in my model may
or may not perform extended audit procedures, depending on the outcome of regular audit procedures.
Patterson and Smith's model, however, is more general in the sense that they allow audit choices in both
rounds, which lets them address the issues in their paper. Smith, Tiras, and Vichitlekarn (2000) analyze
the interaction between internal control assessments and substantive testing using a similar model also with
audit choices in both rounds. In contrast, I simplify the two-round audit setup by allowing an audit choice
only in the second round. This facilitates deriving closed-form results that are useful for guiding empirical
hypotheses for testing.
8
It is not new in the economics literature to make the parsimonious assumption of two exogenous types of
7
2. The insider simultaneously chooses a non-contingent audit fee, F , the amount of ex-
ternal capital to raise, K, and the fraction of ownership to sell, . For simplicity,
only pure strategies in choosing F , K, and  that constitute the pooling equilibrium
is considered here.
9
The choice of F , K, and  is constrained by competitive audit
and nancial market conditions. A competitive audit market requires that the audit
fee F leaves an auditor zero expected prot. Morevoer, a competitive nancial market
requires that outside investors' total cost of investment is equal to the value of the
investment.
10
Further details of this condition will be provided shortly.
3. The insider oers the audit fee F , payable after the audit, to an auditor to secure her
services for a year-end audit.
11
The insider also oers the equity oering terms K and
 to outside investors. Given competitive audit and nancial market conditions and
anticipating the insider's equilibrium choices, the auditor accepts the audit engagement
at the fee oered, and outside investors accept the equity oering terms.
4. The insider invests K+W in the project, earns the return, and chooses the proportion
 of the year-end (after-audit-fee) rm value  = (1 + g)(K +W )  F to divert.
5. At the end of the year, the auditor follows standard practice to perform regular audit
procedures. For simplicity, the cost of these procedures is normalized to zero. The
players with one being irrational. An example is the widely cited paper by Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and
Wilson (1982). Another example is Erard and Feinstein (1994), of which the authors assume that there is an
exogenous fraction of inherently honest taxpayers. This assumption is made to cope with some perplexing
empirical facts often described as the Why people pay tax puzzle in the tax compliance literature.
Accounting studies have also recognized that some people do behave honestly when they should behave
strategically given the monetary incentives. A widely cited example is Evans, Hannan, Krishnan, and Moser
(2001). Mounting evidence of similar irrational behaviors have been documented in the experimental
economics literature, with the ultimatum game being an often cited example (see Camerer and Thaler
1995).
9
A separating equilibrium cannot exist. If an honest insider had a way (e.g., by choosing a high reputation
auditor) to separate himself from a dishonest insider, the auditor and outside investors would not require
premiums in the audit fee and equity oering terms to price-protect themselves, and the auditor would
never extend audit procedures. Given competitive nancial and audit markets, these terms obtained by a
honest insider must be more favorable than what can be obtained by a dishonest insider in such a hypothetical
separating equilibrium. Consequently, a dishonest insider is always better o by mimicking whatever a
honest insider does to pool with him. This invalidates the supposition that a separating equilibrium exists.
10
Here the competitive nancial market condition means outside investors are under perfect competition
to provide capital to the rm. It does not mean outsides investors themselves face a capital supply curve
that is perfectly elastic.
11
That the audit fee is payable after the audit is an inessential dierence from NPS's setup. This change,
however, is more consistent with the incentive of the insider to grow the pie (rm value) as large as possible,
regardless of his incentive to divert resources from the rm.
8
procedures may result in a red ag for potential fraud. The chance of a false positive
(i.e., red ag on despite no fraud) is p = Prfred ag | no fraudg > 0.12 For simplicity,
the chance of a false negative (i.e., red ag o despite fraud) is assumed to be zero, i.e.,
n = Prfno red ag | fraudg = 0. I require that the red ag is an informative signal of
potential fraud so that false positives are less likely than true positives, i.e., p < 1.13
6. Conditional on whether a red ag is observed, the auditor makes the decision x on
extending audit procedures (x = 1) or not (x = 0). She incurs an extra cost C in
extending audit procedures.
7. The auditor cannot give a qualied opinion unless audit evidence supports the opin-
ion. More denite, though not completely conclusive, evidence is available only when
extended audit procedures are performed. So the auditor can only issue an unqualied
opinion if extended audit procedures have not been performed.
8. With probability q > 0, the evidence obtained from extended audit procedures is a
true positive (i.e., proving the existence of fraud). While with probability 1   q the
evidence can also be a false negative (i.e., suggesting no fraud despite fraud), it can
never be a false positive (i.e., showing fraud despite no fraud).
14
9. The audit opinion is issued based on whether evidence of fraud has been obtained.
15
12
The assumption of a non-zero probability of a false positive is consistent with the observation that
while symptoms of fraud (red ags) are observed frequently, the presence of such issues is not necessarily
indicative of fraud (see Hogan, Rezaee, Riley, and Velury, 2008).
13
The results of the paper are essentially unchanged under the more general assumption of n  0 with
the false-to-true-positive likelihood ratio
p
1 n < 1. This likelihood ratio requirement is equivalent to the
monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) often assumed in moral-hazard agency models. To see this,
rst note that the relation between the existence of fraud and the observation of a red ag is analogous
to that between a binary action and a binary outcome in a moral-hazard setting. Thus, the following is
equivalent to the MLRP:
Prfred ag | fraudg
Prfred ag | no fraudg >
Prfno red ag | fraudg
Prfno red ag | no fraudg ;




NPS assume the auditor does only a one-round audit with the fraud detection probability q depending
on the amount of resources invested in the audit. In contrast, the auditor here always performs regular audit
procedures, with the possibility of also performing extended audit procedures. To focus on this unique aspect
of the model, I simplify other aspects with assumptions like an exogenous q. Closed-form results can also
be obtained without aecting the fundamental structure of the equilibrium if alternatively q is proportional
to the diversion rate .
15
This assumes the auditor follows the GAAS to document her work properly and nds it prohibitively
costly to commit a criminal oense by ignoring evidence of fraud.
9
10. If fraud is discovered, the insider must return the diverted resources and also bear a
penalty equivalent to a monetary ne proportional to the amount of resources diverted,
i.e., b, where b > 0. The parameter b indicates the severity of the penalty to an
insider committing fraud, as in NPS's model. If fraud exists but is not discovered by
the auditor, it will nonetheless have a non-zero chance to be discovered in the future,
resulting in some liability cost to the auditor. The present value of the expected
liability cost is assumed to be proportional to the diversion rate, i.e., a, where a > 0.
The parameter a is referred to as the penalty multiplier for the auditor, as in NPS's
model.
16
The model structure and parameters are common knowledge to the insider, outside investors,
and auditor. The timeline in Figure 1 summarizes the sequence of events in the model.
When the auditor decides whether to take the oer F for the audit engagement and
subsequently determines whether to extend audit procedures (x = 1) or not (x = 0), she
knows the insider's choice of K and , which are set to ensure outside investors are not worse
o by investing in the rm. The auditor does not observe the privately chosen diversion
rate  but will make decisions based on an equilibrium conjecture about it. The insider
chooses  after securing the auditor but before she comes in to do the year-end audit. When
he makes the diversion decision, he knows everything except for whether the auditor will
observe a red ag and her decision on x that follows. Such information about the red ag
and extended audit are not known to outside investors either when making the investment
decision in response to the insider's equity oering terms. Nor do they observe F and
.17 They nonetheless make the decision based on equilibrium conjectures about choices
not known to them at that time. Anticipating equilibrium behaviors of other parties and
himself, the insider chooses F , K, and  at the very beginning.
To detail the competitive nancial market condition, let R(K) denote outside investors'
total cost of arranging the capital to invest in the rm. For example, if R(K) is the total cost
16
Like NPS, I make the simplifying assumption that the insider's and auditor's expected penalties are
deadweight losses unrelated to outside investors' payo.
17
The assumption that outside investors cannot observe the audit fee at the moment of making the
investment decision is consistent with the US regulatory requirement of disclosing the audit fee after the
year end. Whether the audit fee is observable actually is inessential here because in equilibrium all players
can correctly anticipate the audit fee as though it was observable.
10
(i.e., principal plus interest) of gettingK dollars from banks, R(K)K  1 would be the borrowing
interest rate. It is thus natural to assume that R(K)  K and R(0) = 0. Although strictly
speaking the cost of capital for outside investors to arrange K dollars should be R(K)K   1,
I will simply call R the cost of capital function.18 A competitive nancial market requires
that the equity oering terms K and  leave outside investors indierent between investing
or not investing in the rm. That is to say, the total cost of investment, R(K), equals the
value of the investment, i.e., the fraction  of the expected year-end (after-audit-fee) rm
value.
To ensure that the insider's equilibrium choice of equity oering terms exists and is an
interior solution characterized by the rst-order condition of maximization, I assume that
R0 > RK > 1 for all K > 0, with R
0(0) < (1+g)(1 ) and limK"1 R(K)K > 1+g:19 In words,
these require, rstly, the marginal cost of capital R0 to be greater than the average cost of
capital
R
K (say, because it is increasingly more costly to borrow more money). Secondly,
R
K > 1 means it is not costless to borrow money. The assumption R
0(0) < (1 + g)(1  ) is
satised if it costs nearly nothing to borrow a tiny amount of money. Finally, limK"1
R(K)
K >
1 + g is met if the cost of capital becomes prohibitively high when the amount borrowed is
enormous.
For the model to be interesting, the audit procedures have to be suciently reliable.
Specically, this means q > 11+b , which requires that the probability q of detecting a fraud
that exists is suciently high. The probability has to be high enough such that given the
severity of the penalty to a fraudster, represented by b, the insider would rather not divert
18
Assumptions on R(K) to be stated shortly capture the fact that no individual nor the whole economy
can provide an unlimited amount of capital at a constant average cost (e.g., at a constant borrowing interest
rate charged by banks), even though everyone in the model is assumed to be risk neutral. NPS simply assume
R(K) = K. I do not make this simplifying assumption because it can lead to non-existence of equilibrium
in my model.
19




with  > 0, r > 0, and 1    > 1+r
1+g
. This functional form subsumes, as a limiting special case, the usual
specication of (1 + r)K, which is assumed in the NPS model.
It is common in economic analysis to make certain technical assumptions to ensure the existence of an
interior solution. The reason is that many analytical techniques are based on the rst-order condition, which
does not hold if an optimization problem only has corner solutions. This important issue sometimes is not
given sucient attention in accounting literature, and the required techinical assumptions are not made
explicit. This paper, however, makes explicit such assumptions.
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any resources if anticipating x = 1 with certainty. Otherwise, it would be in the auditor's
interest to always extend audit procedures without conditioning on the observation of a
red ag. The model would become indistinguishable from the setting already studied by
Patterson and Smith (2007).
It will be clear shortly that [1 + p(1   1)] 1 is the posterior probability of the existence
of a fraud after observing a red ag. Given that a fraud exists, the probability of detecting
it is q. Note that a is essentially the auditor's expected liability cost of not detecting a fraud
with a diversion rate of  = 1. Therefore, the condition
C <
aq
1 + p(1   1)
; (1)
referred to as aordable audit cost, ensures that after observing a red ag, extending audit
procedures reduces the expected liability cost related to a full-diversion fraud by an amount
that exceeds the extra cost of audit. This condition is sucient to deter full diversion,
preventing the uninteresting corner case of  = 1 to constitute an equilibrium. Throughout
my analysis, I assume the condition holds.
To simplify the analysis, I also assume that the insider has sucient wealth to invest in
the project so that at the year end he has enough rm resources to pay for the audit fee,
even without raising any external capital in the very beginning. Specically, this means







[p+ (1  p)] : (3)
It will be clear shortly that the a' on the right hand side of (2) is equal to the equilibrium
audit fee determined in the model. The constant ' summarizes the eects of several pa-
rameters of the model and is larger when (i) the penalty multiplier a that constitutes the
auditor's expected liability cost is smaller; (ii) the unit audit cost C=q of the extended au-
dit procedures is larger; (iii) the false-positive probability p that captures the imprecision of
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the red ag as an early warning is higher; (iv) the prior probability, , of having a dishonest
insider is higher. I will come back to the intuitive interpretation of the constant ' later.
In the next section, I derive the perfect Nash equilibrium of the model using backward
induction. I start with the analysis of the auditor's extended audit decision and the insider's
diversion decision. The analysis of the insider's choice of the audit fee, the amount of capital
to raise, and the fraction of ownership to sell then follows. Because separating equilibrium
strategies do not exist (see footnote 9), an honest insider will simply select the audit fee and
equity oering terms that would be chosen by a dishonest insider. Therefore, I only need to
analyze the decisions from the angle of a dishonest insider.
4 Equilibrium of the Model
4.1 Diversion and Extended Audit Decisions
After observing a red ag, the auditor weighs the incremental benet against the incremental
cost to decide whether it is gainful to extend audit procedures. Given any conjecture  on a
dishonest insider's diversion decision, the incremental benet of extending audit procedures
is a reduction in expected liability cost equal to aqPr{fraud|red ag}. In equilibrium, this
benet must be equal to the incremental cost C.






Since an honest insider never diverts any resources, the prior probability of fraud is simply
the prior probability of having a dishonest insider. By the Bayes' rule,
Pr{fraud|red ag} =
1








1 + p(1   1)
 1 : (6)
This expression of the equilibrium diversion rate shows clearly its determinants. They are
(i) the unit audit cost C=q of the extended audit procedures; (ii) the penalty multiplier
a for the auditor when a fraud was not detected; (iii) the reliability of the red ag as an
indicator of fraud, captured by the posterior probability of having a dishonest insider, i.e.,
1 + p(1   1)
 1
.
Given the equilibrium conjecture , the auditor is indierent between choosing x = 1 or
x = 0. Let ! denote her randomized strategy of extending audit procedures after observing a
red ag, i.e., ! = Pr{x = 1|red ag}.20 The auditor will not extend audit procedures unless
a red ag is observed. Thus, the only way to detect a fraud that exists is to follow through
the sequence of observing a red ag, extending audit procedures, and nding evidence of
fraud. In other words, a dishonest insider knows that the chance of being caught is q!.
If a dishonest insider successfully diverts a fraction of the rm's resources without being
detected, his payo is the sum of (i) diverted resources that he can enjoy personally, , and
(ii) his share of the rm value after the diversion, (1 )(1  ). However, if the diversion
is detected by the auditor, he must return the diverted resources and bear the penalty. His
payo becomes (1  )  b. Given any conjecture !, the expected payo of a dishonest
insider selecting a diversion rate  is as follows:21
[+ (1  )(1  )](1  q!) + [(1  )  b]q!: (7)
In order for  given by (6) to constitute an equilibrium, the diversion rate must satisfy
the rst-order condition below:
(1  q!) = bq!: (8)
20
Modeling this decision of the auditor as a randomized strategy is consistent with the highly stochastic
nature of individual-level economic choices now widely recognized in the literatures of psychology, decision
theory, experimental economics, and accounting (see e.g. Rieskamp 2008, Wilcox 2009, Loomes 2005, and
Fischbacher and Stefani 2007).
21
Like NPS, I assume that if the fraud is not detected by the auditor, the diverted resources will not be
recoverable, say, because the dishonest insider will ee from the country.
14
This condition uniquely determines the auditor's equilibrium randomized strategy of ex-





In the following subsections, I continue the analysis by determining the equilibrium audit
fee, capital to raise, and fraction of ownership to sell.
4.2 Audit Fee
The auditor's expected prot prior to performing regular audit procedures is
F   fC![ + (1  )p] + a(1  q!)g: (10)
The rst term inside the curvy brackets is the expected cost of extending audit procedures.
The cost is incurred only when a red ag is observed, which happens with probability
 + (1  )p, followed by the outcome x = 1, which occurs with probability !. The second
term inside the curvy brackets is the expected liability cost. The auditor will bear the
liability cost a if a fraud exists but is undetected during the audit. This has a chance of
(1  q!) to occur.
Given a competitive audit market and anticipating the insider's and auditor's equilibrium
choices, the equilibrium audit fee F  will be set such that the auditor in equilibrium earns
zero expected prot. In other words, the fee is determined by substituting the equilibrium
! and  into (10) and then setting it to zero to solve for the equilibrium F . This is the
audit fee oered by the insider and accepted by the auditor in equilibrium:
F  = a; (11)
where  is given by (6).
The equilibrium audit fee does not depend on ! because in equilibrium  is chosen to
make the auditor indierent between extending audit procedures or not. Since the cost of
performing regular audit procedures has been normalized to zero, the audit fee only needs
15
to be high enough to cover the auditor's expected liability cost, as though she had never
considered extending the audit procedures.






[p+ (1  p)] : (12)
The false-positive probability p measures the imprecision of the red ag as an early warning.
Ideally one would like regular audit procedures to have a low p so that false positives occur
rarely. In other words, the red ag is more informative when p is smaller. Consequently,
the decision on extending audit procedures can be made more eciently. The equilibrium
audit fee can thus be lower. Similarly, F  is lower when the extended audit procedures are
more eective in detecting fraud, i.e., q is higher. In a society with a higher moral standard,
people are more likely to be honest, i.e.,  is lower, which results in a lower equilibrium audit
fee.
It is useful to recognize that F  = a' and ' = , where the constant ' is dened
in (3). Note that ' = F =a is between 0 and 1. This ratio may be interpreted as a
fraud risk premium for getting the auditor engaged in providing the assurance services.
To see why, consider the limiting case where both  and  are nearly 1. The auditor in
equilibrium is indierent between performing and not performing extended audit procedures.
She anticipates that her expected payo would be equivalent to that without extending the
audit procedures. Since  and  are nearly 1, it is almost certain that she would need
to bear the full diversion liability cost, i.e., a. Therefore, she would not accept the audit
engagement unless the audit fee F  is as much as a. In general, the audit fee is set according
to the anticipated fraction of the full diversion liability cost to be paid by the auditor. This
fraction is expected to be lower if the fraud risk facing the auditor, captured by  and ,
are lower.
A priori, one might expect that through ! = (+b)q , the audit fee F

should be aected
by the ownership sold to outside investors, . This endogenous variable may be seen as a
measure of the misalignment of interest between the insider and other shareholders. If  =
0, the insider is the only shareholder of the rm and has no incentive to divert resources.
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The diversion incentive is strongest when  = 1. In this model, the strategic interaction
between the auditor and her client can result in an equilibrium audit fee independent of .
When  is lower, one might think that the fraud risk should be lower and hence the auditor
would not extend audit procedures so often. Extra costs would be incurred less frequently,
resulting in a lower audit fee. This however is not the complete story. When the auditor
worries less because of a lower ; she has a weaker incentive to extend audit procedures.
Therefore, a dishonest insider worries less about being caught and has a stronger induced
incentive to divert resources. In the end, the two eects balance out and have no net impact
on the equilibrium audit fee.
22
I summarize the observations about the equilibrium audit fee as the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Eects on equilibrium audit fee). The equilibrium audit fee F  decreases
when (i) the reliability of regular and/or extended audit procedures improves, i.e., p is lower











4.3 Capital Raised and Ownership Sold
Given any conjectures about !, , and F , outside investors' expected benet from accepting
the insider's equity oering terms is
(1  )(1  q!) + [1  (1  q!)]; (13)
22
The discussion here cautions against regression analysis that uses an endogenous variable like  to
explain another endogenous variable like F . Ideally, equations specied for regression analysis should have
only exogenous variables as explanatory variables and endogenous variables as dependent variables.
If the model here is used as a framework to interpret empirical ndings, any statistical relationship dis-
covered between outsider ownership and audit fee suggests one of the following: (i) the model is inadequate;
(ii) the relationship is spurious; (iii) the causality runs from F to . I will in section 5.1 show that the last
possibility is consistent with the model.
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where  = (1+g)(K+W ) F is the year-end (after-audit-fee) rm value.23 The probability
(1 q!) in the rst term above is the chance of both having a fraud (i.e., dishonest insider)
and not having it detected during the audit. If this event occurs, the value of the shares
owned by outside investors is only (1   ). If the insider is honest, or if the fraud
of a dishonest insider is detected during the audit, outside investors have a claim on the
undiverted rm, which is the  in the second term above.
A competitive nancial market implies that in equilibrium K and  will be chosen to
equate the expected benet in (13) with outsider investors' total cost of arranging the capital,
i.e. R(K). This condition is expressed as the equation below:
R(K) = [(1 + g)(K +W )  F ]; (14)
where
 = (1 ) (15)
with  = (1   q!) referred to as the eective diversion rate. This rate  diers from
the diversion rate  because there is a chance that the insider is honest. Even if he is
dishonest, diversion may be detected during the audit and therefore unsuccessful. Given
the eective diversion rate , it is intuitive to refer to  as the eective ownership sold to
outside investors (or simply eective outside ownership).
By choosing the eective outside ownership, , a dishonest insider indirectly chooses the
fraction of ownership sold, , and the amount of capital that can be raised, K. To see more
clearly how these variables are related to each other, consider the solutions K() and ()
of the equations below, which are (14) and (15) evaluated at the equilibrium F  , , and
!:
R(K) = (K); (16)
 =  [1  '(1  q!)] ; (17)
23
As in the NPS model, I assume that unless a fraud is discovered during the year-end audit, the diverted
resources are unrecoverable even though the fraud may be eventually discovered some time in the future.
Any future attempt to recover the diverted resources, including ling a lawsuit against the auditor, will end
up in a negligible net gain to outside investors. It is thus omitted here.
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[p+ (1  p)], and ! = =[(+ b)q].24
The second equation above can also be expressed as
2 + b(1  ') = (+ b): (18)
Recall that given the equilibrium probability ! of extending audit procedures, a dis-
honest insider is indierent among alternative choices of the diversion rate. Therefore, in
deciding the fraction of ownership  to sell, his concern is simply to maximize the value of
his retained ownership,
(1  )(K); (19)
as though he had no plan to divert resources. Through (16) and (18), choosing an optimal
eective outside ownership, , also determines the optimal fraction of ownership to sell, ,
and the optimal amount of capital to raise, K. A complete characterization of the optimal
, , and K is given in Lemma 3 stated and proved in the appendix.
In the next section, I examine some implications of the model, namely how the reliability
of regular and extended audit procedures and the ex ante probability of fraud may aect
the likelihood of and market reaction to a nancial reporting and audit delay.
5 Delay Likelihood and Market Reaction
5.1 Eects on Delay Likelihood
The empirical literature on nancial reporting and audit delays has a long history (see
footnote 6). However, rarely have such studies developed empirical tests using a formal
theoretical model. In the following I explore some implications of my model, with the
intention to develop empirically testable hypotheses not yet investigated in the literature.
I focus on two interesting aspects that have been repeatedly examined in the literature,
24K() exists because of the following reasons: First of all, the assumption of sucient wealth, i.e.,
(1 + g)W > a', implies R(K)=(K) > 0. Note that R(K)=(K) = 0 for K = 0. Moreover, R(K)=(K) >
1 for suciently large K. Since R(K)=(K) is continuous in K, there exists a bounded K() solving
R(K)=(K) =  for any given  between 0 and 1.
To see the existence of (), simply note that given the assumptions I make, the quadratic equation (18)
has only one root between 0 and 1 for any given  between 0 and 1.
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namely the determinants and the eects of nancial reporting and audit delays.
Consider rst the likelihood of an audit delay, manifested as a nancial reporting delay.
The delay occurs if and only if the event fx = 1g happens, i.e., the auditor has chosen to
extend audit procedures. Conditional on a red ag, the event happens with probability !.
From outside investors' perspective, a red ag will be observed if (i) the insider is dishonest,
or (ii) he is honest but the red ag is a false positive. Case (i) has a chance of  to occur,
and case (ii) a chance of p(1  ). Thus the equilibrium likelihood of a delay is
Prfx = 1g = ![ + p(1  )] (20)
=
 [p+ (1  p)]
( + b)q
: (21)
To see clearly what determine the likelihood, it is convenient to look at the log transfor-
mation of the relation above:





+ log [p+ (1  p)]  log q: (22)
If the equilibrium outside ownership  could be held constant,25 then the delay likelihood
is higher when the ex ante probability of fraud is higher (i.e.,  is higher), the imprecision
of a red ag is higher (i.e., p is higher), and the eectiveness of extended audit procedures
for fraud detection is lower (i.e., q is lower). A higher ex ante probability of fraud triggers
a red ag more often. It is thus more likely to see a delay. A red ag appears more often
if the red ag is less precise, i.e., false alarms occur more often. A delay thus appears more
often. If the eectiveness of extended audit procedures is lower, the chance of seeing a delay
is higher because extended audit procedures must be performed more often to provide the
same equilibrium level of deterrence to a dishonest insider.
The log-transformed relation can be used as a basis for specifying a regression equation
to empirically test the eects of the above-mentioned factors on the delay likelihood. There
are two caveats. First, nding adequate proxies for the informativeness of regular audit
25
The  can be held constant if the change in , p, or q discussed here is balanced out by a covariation
in C to x the value of ' that enters the equation system (16) and (18). All these factors aect  only
through '.
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procedures and eectiveness of extended audit procedures might be dicult. If auditors in
a competitive audit market are believed to have similar audit technologies, the   log q may
be treated as the intercept to be estimated. Similarly, with a proxy for  included in the
regression equation, the estimated coecient may be interpreted as reecting the level of
p.26
Finding a rm-level proxy for  is also challenging. Suppose that the chance of having
a dishonest insider is related to the insider's moral standard. Arguably this may be traced
back to his family and education background. Suppose one believes that whether the insider
grew up in primary and high schools with strong religious heritages might be relevant. Then
observable characteristics like these can be considered proxies for . Alternatively, one can
argue that  is closely related to the inherent risk of a rm. Then variables like industry,
capitalization, and beta can also be used as proxies for the ex ante probability of fraud.
27
The second caveat of specifying a regression equation based on (22) is the endogeneity of
the outside ownership . Statistically holding it constant might be possible but it correlates
with other factors in the relation through ' that enters the equation system (16) and (18).
For example, the estimated coecient of  can be biased if  is included directly as an
explanatory variable. To mitigate the bias, a 2SLS regression procedure may be used to rst
regress  on  and other control variables. Then the predicted value of  can be included
as an explanatory variable in the regression equation specied based on (22).
Alternatively, one can consider a reduced-form regression equation based on (22) that
includes the exogenous determinants of the outside ownership but not  itself. Because
some of these determinants are already in (22), the predicted signs of such factors need to
be determined more carefully than by merely assuming that  is being held constant. The
next proposition provides the result to sign the eects of those factors. The proposition
follows directly from Lemma 4 stated and proved in the appendix. The lemma requires the
assumptions stated below to show the uniqueness of the optimal solution , , and K
and thereby unambiguously sign the relation between the equilibrium outside ownership 
26
The signs of this coecient and the intercept can be determined by linearizing the term log [p+ (1  p)]
using Taylor's expansion. If one believes a Big4 audit rm means q is higher and p is lower, a Big4 indicator
variable can be included to interact with a proxy for  and also as a standalone control to test the eects of
p and q, whose data usually are dicult to obtain.
27
I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this view and the proxies.
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and the fraud risk premium '.28
Assumption 1 (Regularity condition).





(1 + 1b )
2   '
(1 + b)(1  ')
!
; (23)






Assumption 1 is a regularity condition on the magnitudes of the parameters in the model.
It ensures the satisfaction of the second-order condition of maximization by every solution
of the rst-order condition and thereby establishes the uniqueness of a solution. Note that
the expression in the brackets on the right of (23) is decreasing in b and approaches 1 for a
very large b. Because (1 + g)W > a', the assumption will hold if b is suciently large.
The second assumption concerns requirements on the curvature of the cost of capital
function.
Assumption 2 (Curvature of the cost of capital function). The cost of capital function







 (1 + g)





> 1(1 + g) for all K with R(K)  1(K); (25)
where 1 =
1+b(1 ')






Proposition 2 (Association between outside ownership and audit fee). If Assumptions 1
and 2 hold, d=d' > 0. Hence, for variations in ' driven by variations in , p, and/or q,
28
These assumptions are met by the cost of capital function given in footnote 19, provided the parameter





























Recall that F  = a'. Therefore, by Proposition 1, @'=@ > 0, @'=@p > 0, and @'=@q <
0. Moreover, 

+b is increasing in 

. With d=d' > 0, the signs of the exogenous factors'
eects on the delay likelihood remain the same, regardless of holding  constant or not.
This result is formally stated as the proposition below.
Proposition 3 (Eects on delay likelihood). Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. The
equilibrium delay likelihood decreases when (i) the reliability of the regular and/or extended
audit procedures improves, i.e., p is lower and/or q is higher, or (ii) the ex ante probability
of fraud reduces, i.e.,  is lower. Holding constant these factors and the penalty multiplier
b for a dishonest insider, the equilibrium delay likelihood is positively associated with the













5.2 Market Reaction to Delay
To see how the nancial market should react to a delay, I look at the dierence in the
expected values of the rm right before and right after a delay. Recall that if the insider is
dishonest and the fraud is not detected during the year-end audit, the diverted resources will
be irrecoverable. Consequently, outside investors' ownership of the rm will be worth (1 
)(K) only. However, if the insider is honest, or if he is dishonest but the fraud is detected
during the audit, the shares owned by outside investors will be worth (K). Thus,
all that matters to outside investors is the posterior probability Prfundetected, fraudjx =
1g of having undetected fraud conditional on a delay, relative to the unconditional prior
29
When , p, q, and b are held constant, the variations in  are due to changes in C and/or a.
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probability, i.e.,
(1  q!) = b
 + b
: (26)
Note that a delay could not have occurred unless a red ag was observed. Therefore,
30
Prfundetected, fraudjx = 1g = 1  q
1 + p(1   1)
: (27)
Intuitively, this means conditional on a delay, the posterior probability of having undetected
fraud is lower when the extended audit procedures are more eective in detecting fraud, i.e., q
is higher. Note that

1 + p(1   1)
 1
is the posterior probability of having a dishonest insider
after observing a red ag, i.e., Pr{fraud|red ag}. Suppose the regular audit procedures that
generate a red ag are more informative, i.e., p is lower, or the ex ante probability of fraud
is higher, i.e.,  is higher. Then Pr{fraud|red ag} is higher and consequently the posterior





denote respectively the expected market values of the shares owned by
outside investors before and after observing a delay. The market reaction to a delay can be




, denoted by v:
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1  (1  ) (1  p)  (1  q)  1 + b  
1 + b   '

[p+ (1  p)] : (30)
Note that by (18), 1+ 

b  ' = 
(+b)
b > 0. Hence, the denominator of the expression
for v above is positive. Below is the last result of the paper.
Proposition 4 (Market reaction to delay). The market reaction to a delay, measured by
the percentage deviation of the post-delay market value of the outside ownership from the
30
The derivation of the posterior probability is provided in the appendix.
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1  (1  ) (1  p)  (1  q)  1 + b  
1 + b   '

[p+ (1  p)] ; (31)
which is positive if and only if







The inequality above provides a necessary and sucient condition for observing a positive
market reaction to a delay. If such a market reaction is observed, a delay is perceived by
outside investors as good news. When will this happen?
If the red ag generated from regular audit procedures is imprecise, the delay so triggered
may well be just a false alarm to outside investors. When the ex ante probability of fraud is
high, observing a red ag by the auditor can actually be good to outside investors because
the red ag may trigger an extended audit. This is especially good when the extended audit
is very eective in detecting fraud, leaving little chance for a fraud to sneak through. Thus
a delay can be good news to outside investors when the ex ante probability of fraud, the
imprecision of a red ag, and the eectiveness of extended audit procedures for detecting
fraud are all high.
31
The condition in the proposition above can serve as a basis for specifying a logistic
regression equation. The dependent variable of the regression is binary with the value equal
to 1 for a positive market reaction observed following a delay. The condition suggests that
if the equilibrium outside ownership  could be held constant, the odd of seeing a positive
market reaction increases with , p, and q. On the other hand, holding constant , p, q, and
b, an increase in the equilibrium outside ownship  (e.g., driven by variations in C, a, g,
and/or W ) makes the positive reaction condition harder to be met. If taking into account
31
It might appear that if a nancial reporting delay can result in a positive market response, then the rm
would always delay nancial reporting even when there is no audit delay, seemingly invaliding the result
that a nancial reporting delay can be good news to market investors. This argument, however, assumes
the rm has no cost in adopting such a strategy, which is not true. After the annual report is released,
the date of the audit report would suggest whether the rm has deliberately delaying nancial reporting.
Anticipating that the initial positive market response to a nancial report delay would reverse, the rm has
little incentive to mimic a delay.
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the eects of  and p on the equilibrium outside ownership, only q has an unambiguously
positive eect on the odd of seeing a positive market reaction to a delay.
Even for q, its eect on the magnitude of the market reaction, jvj, cannot be unambigu-
ously determined. This ambiguity is due to the appearance of  both in the top and bottom
components of v. However, if b is very high in a country, given that  cannot exceed 1, one
would expect the changes in

b as a result of the changes in other factors could be negligible.
In such circumstances, a higher q would result in a lower ' and accordingly could lead to
a smaller top component and a larger bottom component of the expression of jvj, assuming
that v is negative. That is to say, when the market reaction to a delay is negative, outside
investors perceive a delay as less of bad news if extended audit procedures are more eective
in detecting fraud, giving outside investors stronger protection.
6 Discussion
The two-round audit process in the model is probably the simplest way to capture the
considerations prescribed in SAS 99 (see the discussion in section 2). The formulation
provides a parsimonious structure to relate the fraud detection role of auditors to nancial
reporting and audit delays, serving the purpose of obtaining closed-form results to guide
empirical research.
Compared to NPS's continuous audit eort formulation, the binary audit choice model
here has some dissimilar results. For example, in this model a greater incentive to extend
audit procedures owing to a higher penalty multiplier a is neutralized by a new equilibrium
diversion rate that continues to make the auditor indierent between extending or not ex-
tending the audit. In the end, the equilibrium audit fee does not depend on a, unlike the
case in the NPS model. For a similar reason, outside ownership  aects the audit fee in
their model but not here.
To clearly dierentiate my contributions from NPS's, I have chosen not to include any
analysis about the eects of the penalty multipliers, a and b, on the equilibrium of my
model. While mine is similar to NPS's model, the strategic consideration of extending audit
procedures is unique. Moreover, I have made additional assumptions, about a non-linear
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(total) cost of capital function, that allow proving the uniqueness of the equilibrium and
unambiguously signing some relations in the comparative static analysis. Recognizing these
dierences between the two models, I believe it should be interesting to examine in future
research the eects of the penalty multipliers on the equilibrium.
The Knechel and Payne (2001) study reports that audit report lag is decreased by
the potential synergistic relationship between MAS and audit services. The model of this
paper provides a theoretical foundation to interpreting the empirical nding in this way.
Specically, I have shown that dPrfx = 1g=dp > 0 and dPrfx = 1g=dq < 0. If indeed
a synergistic relationship between MAS and audit services results in a less imprecise red
ag generated by regular audit procedures and more eective extended audit procedures
for detecting fraud, it will reduce the likelihood of a delay. Intuitively speaking, this is
consistent with a reduction in the audit report lag.
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What my model has not incorporated
is the potential judgmental bias that might result from a closer business relationship with
an audit client purchasing also MAS. Extending the model in this direction provides another
avenue for future research.
Ettredge, Li, and Sun (2006), p. 5, argue that [a]uditors ... need to extend their scope
of work and perform additional substantive tests to compensate for the control weakness.
... The extended audit eort due to control weakness should lead to longer audit delay.
However, I believe that such a delay needs not be signicant if the auditors have prepared
enough manpower to do the additional tests concurrently. Presumably, the control weak-
nesses are identied mainly in the planning phase. It can be well ahead of the peak period
around the scal year end when the auditors are completely tied up and unable to easily
nd more new hires to provide the extra help. Such a control weakness driven delay might




In its present form, the model cannot directly talk about audit report lag because the delay is modeled
as a 0-1 event with a xed delay duration. A modication to it using some hazard-rate function modeling
technique would better t the model to the empirical literature on audit report lag.
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For control weaknesses discovered during the audit after the planning phrase, they are equivalent to the
red ag discussed in this paper and can lead to a delay not fully anticipated.
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7 Concluding Remarks
This paper contributes to the literature of nancial reporting and audit delays by providing
a theoretical model to examine the likelihood of and market reaction to a delay. I have
chosen to make the least departure from the NPS model, which is useful in understanding
closely related issues like the role of auditing in investor protection. The key departure from
their model is a two-round audit process. This modeling strategy lets a reader understand
what this main departure can do. Specically, the departure allows (i) formalizing intuitions
and deriving predictions consistent with what are known in the literature (e.g., the positive
association between audit fee and outside ownership) and (ii) on top of this, adding an
interesting new insight that is hard to discover without the help of such a model (i.e., the
possibility of a positive market reaction to a delay).
I attempt to reach out to an empirical-oriented audience by discussing the model's empir-
ical implications in detail, including specics about how the model can provide suggestions
for regression equation specications. I wish that by taking a step towards this direction,
empirical and analytical researchers can work closer together to advance knowledge of the
eld. If empirical researchers nd it easier to formulate a testable hypothesis with this paper
than without it, I consider this attempt a success.
I have discussed in length the empirical implications of the model. Any empirical test
based on this model is a joint test of the model predictions and assumptions. Keeping in
mind this caveat can avoid mistaking spurious ndings as evidence for supporting the model.
For example, the model assumes fraud is the main issue behind a delay. In reality, there
are other reasons leading to delays. In constructing the sample for an empirical test, it is
important to take into consideration such reasons. I elaborate on this point in appendix A
where an illustrative example of an empirical test design is discussed.
To facilitate deriving closed-form results useful for guiding empirical hypothesis testing,
simplifying assumptions have been made to keep the model tractable. For example, unlike
prior models with a two-round audit, I do not allow the auditor to make continuous audit
choices. Allowing continuous choices potentially could make the model useful for addressing
a number of additional questions: e.g., When is it more ecient for the auditor to focus
28
on the rst-round audit and when is it more ecient to focus on the second? How does
the auditor respond to an increase in the strictness of the legal environment when there are
two rounds of audit instead of one? Are the eort levels in the two rounds substitutes or
complements? While these questions are interesting, they are not the focus of this paper
and are left for future research.
I have also assumed that honesty is exogenously determined in the model. Recent devel-
opment in economic theory has begun analyzing endogenous honesty behavior using lying
cost models (e.g., Kartik 2008). Advocates argue that business ethics education in MBA
programs should be strengthened to reduce unethical behaviors of future business leaders.
Suppose business ethics education is eective. The model here then suggests if such edu-
cation reduces  (i.e., the prior probability of having a dishonest insider) from 5% to 4%
(a one-percent dierence), it will save society in audit cost by a percentage approximately
equal to (1  p) = [1  0:95 (1  p)].34 Investigation along this line provides an avenue for
quantitative business ethics research.
Suppose a government has one extra dollar to be used on reducing fraud. Should it be
spent on reducing the imprecision of a red ag, i.e., p, or on enhancing the eectiveness
of extended audit procedures for detecting fraud, i.e., q? Or would it be even better to
spend the extra dollar on decreasing the chance of having a dishonest insider, i.e., ; say,
by providing better business ethics education that works? These are interesting questions
unanswered here. However, the model of this paper can provide a vehicle for future research









1  0:95 (1  p) :
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Appendix
A Illustrative Example of an Empirical Test Design
The purpose of this appendix is to demonstrate how a theoretical result of the paper can
provide an easier starting point for formulating an empirical test design. It is not intended
to be a detailed cookbook for one to follow step by step to conduct an empirical study.
In the main text, I have taken the strategy to explore what a key departure from the
NPS model can do. Therefore the endogenous choice of the external capital K and outside
ownership  in their model is maintained. However, the positive-reaction condition (32)
that predicts whether there will be a positive market reaction to a delay is unaected if K
and  are predetermined. Below I consider this simplied version of the model. The sample
constructed accordingly should be larger because most rms do not have equity oering in
most years.
The positive-reaction condition predicts that with everything else being equal, if a posi-
tive reaction to a delay occurs to a rm with an ex ante probability of fraud , it should also
occur to rms with higher 's. To construct a sample for testing this hypothesis, it is im-
portant to exclude observations with known reasons for delays unrelated to fraud concerns,
e.g., due to mergers and acquisitions. Holding constant b, i.e., the penalty multiplier for a
fraudster, should not be a problem if the sample observations are under a single jurisdiction.
This is true for many countries but not necessarily for the US because the states can dier
in their choices of b. Because the outside ownership  is observable, an attempt to hold
it constant can be made by ranking rms by decile so that the test can be done based on
observations in each decile.
Holding constant the imprecision p and the eectiveness q of the two-round audit process
is a challenge because they are not directly observable. Suppose both p and q is highly
correlated with a single observable quality of auditors. Then ranking auditors by decile
based on the quality and testing the hypothesis using observations in each decile can provide
a way to reduce the variations in the unobservable p and q. Besides the Big4 versus non-
Big4 classication, the accuracy rate of an auditor's going-concern opinions can be another
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candidate to proxy for the observable quality.
Finding proxies for  is less dicult. One can twist the interpretation of the model by
arguing that insiders are always dishonest. However, whether they have the opportunity
to divert rm resources for private benet depends crucially on the corporate governance
and internal control environments. With this alternative interpretation,  can be proxied
by a variety of corporate governance variables like CEO-chairman duality, the number of
independent directors, and the size of the board. It can also be proxied by data on internal
control weaknesses.
With a proxy for , one can test a weak version of the hypothesis by arguing as follows:
A positive reaction to a delay might be rare. However, even when the usual negative reaction
to a delay is observed, the response should be weaker if the news is less bad. The positive-
reaction condition provides a way to classify good and bad news. If  is high, the news of a
delay is not as bad as when  is low because the market is psychologically prepared and
not shocked by the delay. Based on this reasoning, one can partition the sample by the
median value of a proxy for . A weaker negative market reaction is thus expected for the
above-median subsample.
B Proofs and Derivations
The proposition below qualitatively summarizes some results in Lemma 1 concerning how
the capital raised, K, and ownership sold, , are related to the eective outside ownership, .
The lemma is stated and proved in this appendix after a brief discussion of the implication
of the proposition given below.
Proposition 5 (Relations among capital raised, ownership sold, and eective outside own-
ership). The amount of capital raised K and fraction of ownership sold , as functions of
the eective outside ownership , have the following properties:
(i) The amount of capital raised is strictly increasing in the eective outside ownership,
i.e., K 0 > 0;
(ii) The fraction of ownership sold is strictly increasing and concave in the eective
outside ownership, i.e., 0 > 0 and 00 < 0.
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The monotonicity of K and  as functions of  imply that the amount of capital raised
is positively related to the fraction of ownership sold. The relation highlights the tension
between growing the pie bigger and retaining a larger slice of the pie. Given the fraud
risk to outside investors, the insider is unable to raise more capital to grow the pie bigger
(a higher year-end rm value) unless he accepts a smaller slice of the pie (a lower retained
ownership 1  , or equivalently, a higher eective outside ownership ).
Lemma 1. The amount of capital raised K and fraction of ownership sold , as functions
of the eective outside ownership , have the following properties:














2(1 + g) R00K 0
R0   (1 + g) ; (35)














[(+ b)2   b2']2 < 0; (38)
(iii) The shape of the fraction of ownership sold, as a function of the eective outside










(1 + b)2   b2': (40)
Proof. (Lemma 1) Dierentiating both sides of (16) with respect to  yields
R0K 0 = (K) + (1 + g)K 0: (41)
The rst derivative of K() thus equals
K 0 =
(K)
R0   (1 + g) ; (42)
By assumption, (0) = (1 + g)W   a' > 0 and R0 > R=K. Given a competitive nancial
market, R =  and R0 > =K = [(1 + g)K + (0)]=K > [(1 + g). Hence, the rst
derivative K 0 is strictly positive for all K > 0. Recall that R(0) = 0. When  = 0, both 





To derive K 00=K 0, I dierentiate both sides of (41) with respect to  once more to get
R00(K 0)2 +R0K 00 = 2(1 + g)K 0 + (1 + g)K 00: (44)




2(1 + g) R00K 0
R0   (1 + g) : (45)
Now dierentiating both sides of (18) with respect to , I get
20 + b(1  ')0 = + b+ 0: (46)
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Rearranging the terms gives the rst derivative of () below:
0 =
+ b
2  + b(1  ') : (47)







Since    = b'=(+ b), the rst derivative of () can be written as
0 =
(+ b)2
(+ b)2   b2' > 0: (49)
When  = 0, 0(0) = 1=(1   '). To derive 00=0, I dierentiate both sides of (46) with
respect to  once more to get
2(0)2 + 200 + b(1  ')00 = 20 + 00: (50)





2  + b(1  ') : (51)
Note that
1  0 =     b'
2  + b(1  ') (52)





(+ b)[2  + b(1  ')]2 (53)
=   2b
2'(+ b)
[(+ b)2   b2']2 : (54)
To complete the proof of this lemma, I derive below the lower bounds of 00=0 and
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0=(1  ). Consider rst the following function:
h() =
(+ b)
[(+ b)2   b2']2 : (55)
Since 00=0 =  2b2'h(()) < 0 and 0 > 0, the ratio 00=0 reaches its lowest value when
h() reaches its highest value. Dierentiating h once gives
h0 =   3(+ b)
2 + b2'
[(+ b)2   b2']3 < 0: (56)
This means h reaches its maximum at  = 0, or equivalently at  = 0. Hence, the following






b(1  ')2 : (57)
Note that when  = 1, equation (18) implies  equals
1 =
1 + b(1  ')
1 + b
: (58)
Since 00 < 0, 0 reaches its lowest value at  = 1. Thus,
0
1    
0  0(1) = (1 + b)
2
(1 + b)2   b2': (59)
Lemma 2. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then the following conditions also hold for
any , (), and K() satisfying the FOC :
R00
R0   (1 + g) >
(1 + g)b
a[+ b(1  ')] (60)
and
R00K 0




Proof. (Lemma 2) First, recall that K 0 > 0. So the inverse function of K, denoted by




R0   (K)(1 + g) (62)
with
J 0 =
R000[R0   (K)(1 + g)] R00[R00   0(1 + g)]
[R0   (K)(1 + g)]2 : (63)
The rst derivative is positive if and only if the following inequality holds:
[R000R0   (R00)2] + (1 + g)[R
00
K 0
  (K)R000] > 0: (64)
The rst term above is non-negative under Assumption 2. To show that J(K) reaches its
minimum at K = 0, it suces to prove that R00 > (K)K 0R000.
Given the competitive nancial market condition, R(K) = (K), and that K 0 =
(K)=[R0   (1 + g)],
(K)K 0 = R(K)=[R0   (1 + g)]: (65)




> (K)(1 + g): (66)
This condition is met under Assumption 2 because (K) must not exceed 1, the maximum
possible value of  (which is constrained by the corresponding value of  that is at most 1).
In conclusion, J(K) is increasing in K and reaches its minimum at K = 0,
Since R(0) = 0 and (0) > 0, (K) = R(0)=(0) = 0. Consequently,
R00
R0   (K)(1 + g) 
R00
R0
 (1 + g)
a(1  ') 
(1 + g)b
a[+ b(1  ')] ; (67)
where the second inequality is due to Assumption 2.






































(1 + b)2   b2'

: (71)
The second inequality above uses the fact that(K) is smallest atK = 0. The last inequality
uses the result of Lemma 1.










Thus, by Lemma 1,
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In conclusion, for any , (), and K() satisfying the FOC,
R00K 0




Lemma 3 (Optimal choice of equity oering terms). The optimal amount of capital to raise
K, fraction of ownership to sell , and eective outside ownership  exist and satisfy the
conditions of the following equation system:









(1  )(1 + g)
R0(K)  (1 + g) =
(+ b)2
(+ b)2   b2'; (80)





[p+ (1  p)]. Additionally,
0 <  < 1  1 + b(1  ')1 + b and 
 <  < 1: (81)
The optimal K, , and  are unique if any solution of the equation system satises also
the condition below :
R00K 0




which is met under Assumptions 1 and 2.
The rst condition of the equation system above is the competitive nancial market
condition discussed earlier. It species the pricing of the equity oering, linking the amount
of capital raised K to the eective outside ownership . The second condition describes how




The last condition of the equation system is a re-expression of the rst-order condition
of maximization that characterizes the optimal eective outside ownership. In its original
form, the condition describes how the marginal benet and marginal cost of increasing the
eective outside ownership balance out with each other at optimum. On the one hand, a
marginal increase in  raises the external capital by an amount of K 0. Each dollar of such
an increase is multiplied by 1 + g through the investment project. Only 1    of the extra
(1 + g)K 0 belongs to the insider given his retained ownership. The diversion decision does
not show up in this calculation because given the equilibrium extended audit decision, the
insider is indierent among alternative choices of the diversion rate and acts as though he
had no plan to divert resources. The insider's marginal cost of increasing  is the reduction
in his claim on the year-end rm value (K) by an amount of 0. What the rst-order
ec-9
condition says is that in equilibrium the marginal benet equals the marginal cost:
(1  )(1 + g)K 0 = 0(K) (83)
By Lemma 1, K 0=(K) = 1=[R0   (1 + g)] and 0 = ( + b)2=[( + b)2   b2']. The
rst-order condition can thus be expressed as the third condition of the equation system in
Lemma 3.
Proof. (Lemma 3) Given the one to one mappings from  to  and K, it is convenient to
determine the optimal pair of (;K) by maximizing a dishonest insider's expected payo
over the domain of . To do so, I substitute () and K() into (19) to obtain the following
objective function that incorporates the restrictions of (16) and (18):
 = (1  ())(K()): (84)
The denition of , namely (17), implies that 0 <  <  for all  > 0 and  = 0 for  = 0.
When  = 1, equation (18) implies  equals
1 =
1 + b(1  ')
1 + b
: (85)
So the optimal , denoted by , is determined by maximizing  over the domain [0; 1].
Since limK"1R(K)=K > 1 + g, a suciently large K violates the competitive nancial
market condition R(K) = (K). Thus,  is bounded. This together with the continuity
of  ensures an optimal  exists. Below I show that  cannot be at the corners of the
domain [0; 1]. Therefore, it must be a solution of the following rst-order condition (FOC):
0 = (1  ())(1 + g)K 0   0(K()) = 0: (86)
The corresponding optimal  and K can be obtained by solving equations (16) and (18)
given the  = .
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Note that  = 0 implies  = 0 and K = 0. Hence,









where (0) = (1 + g)W   a'. The second equality above uses the fact that K 0(0) =
(0)=R0(0) and 0(0) = 1=(1 '), according to Lemma 1. By assumption, (1 + g)(1  ) >
R0(0). Thus, 0(0) > 0.35 In other words, some suciently small  is strictly better than
the corner at zero. When  = 1,  = 1, which implies 0(1) =  0(1)(K(1)) < 0. So
the other corner is not optimal either.
Because neither of the corners of the domain [0; 1] is optimal, the optimal  must be
an interior solution characterized by the rst-order condition. Note that 0 is continuous
over the domain [0,1]. As 
0(0) > 0 and 0(1) < 0, 0 must cut across the zero line at
some point from above. Only such a solution of the FOC satises the second-order condition
of a maximum and is an optimal .
Next I show that if every  that solves the FOC also satises (82) in the proposition, it
must then satisfy 00 < 0 as well. In other words, 0 always cuts across the zero line from
above. This necessarily means there is only one  that solves 0 = 0. Hence this is the
unique optimal choice that maximizes the objective function . To prove this, consider the
second derivative of :
00 =  2(1 + g)0K 0 + (1  )(1 + g)K 00   00(K): (89)
For any  that solves the FOC, i.e. (1  )(1 + g)K 0 = 0(K), the second derivative of 
at that  is given by
00 =  0












Since K 0 = (K)=[R0 (1+ g)] and K 00=K 0 = 2(1+ g) R00K 0=[R0 (1+ g)], the second
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It suces to merely assume (1 + g)(1 ') > R0(0). The stronger assumption replaces the more compli-






















which is strictly negative under Assumptions 1 and 2.
To complete the proof, I only need to rewrite the rst-order condition in the form as
provided in the lemma. Substituting K 0 = (K)=[R0   (1 + g)] into the condition gives
0 =
(1  )(1 + g)
R0   (1 + g) : (93)
Using a result of Lemma 1 to substitute for 0 on the left hand side, I obtain
(1  )(1 + g)
R0   (1 + g) =
(+ b)2
(+ b)2   b2': (94)







On top of these two conditions, add the one below that is due to a competitive nancial
market:
R(K) = (K); (96)
where (K) = (1+g)(K+W ) a'. Altogether they form a system of three equations with
three unknowns that determines the optimal , , and K.
Lemma 4. The equilibrium outside ownership  and eective outside ownership  are




































[R0   (1 + g)] ; (98)





[p+ (1  p)]. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 also hold. Then d=d' 
0 and d=d' > 0.
Proof. (Lemma 4) Substituting the optimal K, , and  into (78) and (79), I obtain
the following identities:


























































K 0   
a


















To obtain the third identity for deriving the total derivatives, I substituteK 0 = (K)=[R0 
(1 + g)] into the FOC (86) evaluated at the optimal values to get
(1  )(1 + g) = 0()[R0(K)  (1 + g)]: (105)
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(1 + g)0: (106)





















R0   (1 + g) :
(107)












































Moreover, by Lemma 1,
0 =
(+ b)2
(+ b)2   b2': (110)













[R0   (1 + g)]

;














  (1 + g)b[(









R0   (1 + g)  
(1 + g)b
 + b(1  ')

:

















[R0   (1 + g)] : (111)
By Assumption 2, the bottom expression on the right hand side is strictly positive. This
means d=d'  0 if and only if
aR00
R0   (1 + g) 
(1 + g)b
 + b(1  ') : (112)
According to the proof of Lemma 2 provided in the appendix, the inequality is satised
under Assumption 2. This also implies d=d' > 0, given (104).
Derivation. (Posterior probability of undetected fraud conditional on a delay)
Because a delay necessarily means a red ag has been observed,
Prfundetected, fraudjx = 1g (113)
= Prfundetected|fraud; x = 1gPrffraudjx = 1g (114)















Prfx = 1; red agjfraudg











1 + p(1   1)
: (120)
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Table 1: List of parameters and variables
 = prior probability of having a dishonest insider
p = chance of observing a false-positive red ag (i.e., red ag on despite no
fraud)
n = chance of observing a false-negative red ag (i.e., red ag o despite fraud)
q = probability of detecting fraud that exists
C = extra cost incurred as a result of extending audit procedures
x = decision on extending audit procedures (x = 1) or not (x = 0)
! = probability of the auditor's randomized choice of x, conditional on
observing a red ag
 = diversion rate, i.e., the proportion of the rm's resources to divert
 = (1  q!), referred to as eective diversion rate
 = fraction of ownership to sell (also referred to as outside ownership)
 = (1 ), referred to as eective outside ownership
K = amount of external capital to raise
R(K) = outside investors' total cost of arranging K dollars of capital to invest in
the rm;
R(K)
K   1 = cost of capital for raising K dollars
R = (total) cost of capital function
g = constant rate of return on any amount of capital invested in the rm's
project
W = endowed wealth of the insider
F = non-contingent audit fee, payable after the audit
 = (1 + g)(K +W )  F , i.e., year-end (after-audit-fee) rm value
b = penalty multiplier for an insider committing fraud






[p+ (1  p)], referred to as fraud risk premium.
  










θ and honest with 
1-θ. 
The insider 
chooses the audit 
fee F, external 
capital to raise K, 
and fraction of 






accepts the audit 
fee offered. 
The insider 
invests in the 
project and earns 
the return; a 
dishonest insider 
chooses the rate δ 
of the year-end 
firm value П to 
divert. (An 
honest insider 





a red flag is 
observed with 
probability 1 or 
p, depending on 
whether fraud 




to extend audit 
procedures (x = 
1) by incurring 
an extra cost C or 





be a false 
negative with 
probability 1-q 
but can never be 
a false positive. 
The audit opinion 
is issued based 
on whether 
evidence of fraud 
has been 
obtained. 






also bear a 
penalty of bδΠ. If 
fraud exists but is 
not discovered by 
the auditor, she 
has an expected 
liability cost 
equal to aδ. 
 
 
 
